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The Pennsylvania Workers' Compensation
Reform as it Affects the Pennsylvania
Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility
Law
I. Introduction
The summer of 1993 brought with it both tragedy and change. The
Midwest found itself under siege from the waters of the mighty
Mississippi.' The United States Congress confirmed the Presidential
nomination of Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg to the United States Supreme
Court.2  And, major league baseball witnessed its last two 3 traditional
pennant races.4
Amidst all these headlines was another change that may have gone
unnoticed by many Pennsylvanians. For the first time in almost two
decades, the Pennsylvania Legislature enacted a comprehensive reform to
the Workmen's Compensation Act.5 On July 2, 1993, Lt. Governor
Mark Singel6 signed into law an Act7 intended to reduce workers'
compensation premiums8 by making broad changes in health care
benefits and medical costs.9 As another means of reducing worker's
1. The flooding in the Midwest resulted in the evacuation of 22,000 people, the deaths of 16
people and possibly one billion dollars in agricultural losses. Eloise Salholz, The 'Billion-Dollar
Flood' Keeps on Rolling Along, NEWSWEEK, July 19, 1993, at 22.
2. Linda Greenhouse, Senate Easily Confirms Judge Ginsburg, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 1993, at
B8.
3. Mel Antonen, Four-Game Edge Not Same to Phils, Jays, USA TODAY, Sept. 20, 1993, at
Cl. Specifically, the New York Yankees and the Toronto Blue Jays were contending for the
American League East title and the San Francisco Giants and the Atlanta Braves were fighting for
the National League West title. Id.
4. Claire Smith, From Twilight Zone to Strike Zone, It's Wild, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 1994,
at C1. In 1994, baseball's National and American Leagues were realigned. Id. Each league now
has three divisions instead of the traditional two. Id. As a result, in order to balance divisional
league playoffs, each league will now have to produce a "wild card" team (best record of non-
division winners). Id. Inevitably, this will lessen the intensity of play in the late summer months
because a team which does not win its division can still make it to the playoffs. Id.
5. Act of July 2, 1993, Act. No. 1993-44, 1993 Pa. Legis. Serv. I (Purdon) (amending 77
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 1-1603 (1993)).
6. On June 14, 1993, Lieutenant Mark Singel became acting governor because Governor
Robert Casey underwent heart/liver transplant surgery. Brad Bumsted, Singel: Steering Steady
Course for PA, Gannett News Service, Harrisburg Bureau, November 5, 1993.
7. Act of July 2, 1993, Act No. 1993-44, 1993 Pa. Legis. Serv. 1 (Purdon).
8. The necessity for reform was spurred in the fall of 1991 when the Pennsylvania Rating
System, a private organization representing more than 300 insurance companies, proposed an
increase of nearly 52% in worker's compensation premiums for 1992. Tom Dochat, Doctors,
Hospitals Oppose Plan: Cost Controls Criticized in Casey's Reform Proposal, THE PATRIOT
NEWS, March 10, 1992, at B3.
9. A thorough analysis of all the reforms is beyond the scope of this Comment. However, a
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compensation premiums, the Act repeals four provisions of the
Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Act.'0  The
few of the Act's key reform provisions are included to enhance the reader's understanding.
Section 306 of the Workers' Compensation Act underwent extensive revision, particularly
with respect to the employer's obligations and procedures for treatment once an employee is
injured. An employer will be required to establish a list of at least six health care providers, no
more than two of which comprise a coordinated care organization and no fewer than three of
whom are physicians; the employer can have no financial interest in these designated providers,
unless that interest is clearly disclosed. 77 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 306(f.i)(1)(i). The injured
party must treat with one of these six providers for a mandatory period of thirty days before he
can treat with a physician of his own. Id. If the employee does so, or if after thirty days he does
not give notice of a new health care provider within five days of the first visit, the employer is
not financially responsible for that treatment if treatment is determined unnecessary or
unreasonable. Id. Furthermore, the employer must give clear notice of an employee's rights and
obligations for reporting injuries and treatment, and must obtain the employee's written
acknowledgment that he understands his rights and obligations. Id.
A treating physician must file a report with the employer or insurer within ten days of the
first visit and every month thereafter. Id. This report is to include the patient's history,
diagnosis, treatment, prognosis, and any and all physical findings. 77 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §
306(f.1)(2). There is no obligation to pay for treatment until these reports are filed. Id.
Treatment costs are limited to 113% of charges as determined by the Medicare provisions
and, if there is no Medicare determination, the medical treatment is limited to 80% of what is
usual and customary in that geographic area. 77 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 306(f.l)(3)(i). This
limit is frozen until January 1, 1995, after which the limit on medical costs shall increase by the
same percentage as the increase in the statewide average weekly wage. Id. Furthermore, the
reimbursement for prescription medicines is limited to 110% of the average wholesale price for
that medicine. Id.
As further control on medical costs, it shall be unlawful for a physician to refer a patient
for treatment or testing to a facility in which that physician has a financial interest, nor may a
system of cross referral be established which the provider knows or should know that, if referred
directly, would be a violation. 77 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 306(f.l)(3)(iii). The Act establishes
a utilization review organization, certified by the Department of Health, that will serve to revamp
the review of reasonable and necessary medical services. 77 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §
306(f. 1)(6). The Act states that all payments for treatment must be made within thirty days
unless a party disputes the reasonableness or necessity for that treatment. 77 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 306(f.1)(5). An employer, employee or provider may file an application for review with
the Department, which will result in a decision by a utilization review organization within a
thirty-day period. 77 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 306(f.1)(6)(ii). If any party disagrees with the
determination, he may file for reconsideration. 77 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 306(f.l)(6)(iii). The
expense for reconsideration is paid by the party who fails to prevail upon reconsideration. Id. If,
after reconsideration, a dispute remains, the aggrieved party is required to file a Petition for
Review which will be assigned to a Referee for hearing. 77 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §
306(f.l)(6)(iv). Memorandum from Patricia A. Mattem, Carol S. Neitz, Brian L. Calistri, Sheryl
G. Pincus, John P. Meyers, Lizabeth R. Brown, partners and associates of Rawle & Henderson
(July 3, 1993)(on file with the author).
10. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 1701-1798 (Supp. 1993). Specifically, the repealed
provisions are sections 1720, 1722, 1735 and 1737. The repealed provisions expressly provide:
SUBCHAPTER B. MOTOR VEHICLE LIABILITY INSURANCE FIRST PARTY
BENEFITS
§ 1720. Subrogation
In actions arising out of the maintenanceor use of a motor vehicle, there shall be no right
of subrogation or reimbursement from a claimant's tort recovery with respect to workers'
1098
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repealed sections impact employees who are injured in work-related
automobile accidents." First, the repeals reinstate the employer's right
of subrogation in third party actions initiated by an injured employee.
Second, the repeals eliminate the employee's ability to collect
compensation benefits, benefits available under section 1711 (relating to required benefits),
1712 (relating to availability of benefits), or 1715 (relating to availability of adequate
limits) or benefits paid or payable by a program, group contract or other arrangement
whether primary or excess under section 1719 (relating to coordination of benefits).
§ 1722. Preclusion of recovering required benefits
In any action for damages against a tortfeasor, or in any uninsured or underinsured
motorist proceeding, arising out of the maintenance or use of a motor vehicle, a
person who is eligible to receive benefits under the coverages set forth in this
subchapter, or workers' compensation, or any program, group contract or other
arrangement for payment of benefits as defined in section 1719 (relating to
coordination of benefits) shall be precluded from recovering the amount of benefits
paid or payable under this subchapter, or workers' compensation, or any program,
group contract or other arrangement for payment of benefits as defined in section
1719.
SUBCHAPTER C. UNINSURED AND UNDERINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE
§ 1735. Coverages unaffected by workers' compensation benefits
The coverages required by this subchapter shall not be made subject to an exclusion or
reduction in amount because of any workers' compensation benefits payable as a result of the
same injury.
§ 1737. Workers' compensation benefits not a bar to uninsured and underinsured motorist
benefits
Notwithstanding anything contained in the act of June 2, 1915 (P.L. 736, No. 338),
known as The Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Act, no employee who is
otherwise eligible shall be precluded from recovery of uninsured or underinsured
motorist benefits from an employer's motor vehicle policy under this chapter or the
act of August 14, 1963 (P.L. 909, No. 433), entitled "An act requiring, with
limitations, that insurance policies insuring against loss, occurring in connection with
motor vehicles provide protection against certain uninsured motorists."
Id. at §§ 1720, 1722, 1735 and 1737 (repealed 1993) (footnotes and citations omitted).
1!. Interview with Timothy A. Shollenberger, Attorney Specializing in Motor Vehicle
Accidents, in Harrisburg, PA (Nov. 9, 1993).
12. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 712 (6th ed. 1990). "The substitution of one person in the
place of another with reference to lawful claims, demand or right, so that he who is substituted
succeeds to the rights of the other in relation to the debt or claim, and its rights, remedies, or
securities." Id. at 1427.
99 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW SUMMER 1995
uninsured 3  and underinsured' 4  motorist benefits through his
employer's automobile insurance policy.
This Comment contends that the repeals, although seemingly
innocent in nature when compared to the Act's reforms overall, 5 will
not produce the intended result of decreasing workers' compensation
premiums. In fact, the repeals will only produce a windfall for the
insurance industry. Moreover, the repeals will prevent employees injured
in motor vehicle accidents from being completely compensated for their
injuries.
Part II of the Comment provides an introduction to subrogation and
explains the previous state of subrogation law under the Pennsylvania No-
Fault Motor Vehicle Insurance Act and the Motor Vehicle Financial
Responsibility Law. Part III explains the present state of the subrogation
law as effected by the repeals. Part IV addresses the problem of the
uninsured and underinsured motorist. It also presents the previous state
of the law in Pennsylvania under the Uninsured Motorist Act and the
Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law. Part V explains the effect
the repeals have on uninsured and underinsured motorist protection.
Finally, Part VI provides the reasons why the repeals will not produce the
intended result of lowering insurance premiums. Part VI will also
demonstrate how the repeals will impact injured employees and ultimately
prevent them from being fully compensated for work-related injuries.
13. An "uninsured motor vehicle" is defined as any of the following:
(1) A motor vehicle for which there is no liability insurance or self-insurance
applicable at the time of the accident.
(2) A motor vehicle for which the insurance company denies coverage or the
insurance company is or becomes involved in insolvency proceedings in any
jurisdiction.
(3) An unidentified motor vehicle that causes an accident resulting in injury
provided that the accident is reported to the police or proper governmental authority
and the claimant notifies his insurer within 30 days, or as soon as practicable
thereafter, that the claimant or his legal representative has a legal action arising out
of he accident.
75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1702 (Supp. 1993).
14. An "underinsured motor vehicle" is defined as "a motor vehicle for which the limits of
available liability insurance and self-insurance are insufficient to pay losses and damages." 75
PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 1702 (Supp. 1994).
15. This author describes the repeals as "seemingly innocent" because they are found on the
last two pages of the Act and appear to be included almost as an afterthought. Act of July 2,
1993, Act. No. 1993-44, 1993 Pa. Legis. Serv. at 102-103 (Purdon).
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II. Subrogation: An Overview
Subrogation is an equitable doctrine 6 by which an insurer who has
paid a claim for his insured becomes a creditor of that claim or right
against the third party who is primarily liable,' 7 usually a tortfeasor.
Essentially, subrogation enables an insurer to "stand in the shoes" of the
insured,' The doctrine of subrogation originated in the context of
property insurance. 19 Initial attempts to expand subrogation rights into
the realm of personal insurance met with resistance." However,
persistence on the part of the insurance industry proved fruitful, 2' and
subrogation rights were expanded to include payments of medical
expenses and other non-property claims.22
The concept of subrogation is premised on two basic theories. First,
a tortfeasor should not be unjustly enriched merely because the injured
party had the foresight to purchase insurance coverage to compensate him
for his injuries.23 Second, subrogation prevents the injured party from
receiving a "double recovery" for only one loss.24  Although the
insurers' right to subrogation is usually contractual,25 the right to
subrogation may also arise by statute.26  Indeed, the Workers'
Compensation Act27 is such a statute; it permits a general right of
16. See generally, ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN I. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW § 3.10 (1988).
17. 35 PA. L. ENCYCLOPEDIA 244 (1961).
18. Roger M. Baron, Subrogation on Medical Expense Claims: The "Double Recovery"
Myth and the Feasibility of Anti-Subrogation Laws, 96 DICK. L. REV. 581 (1992).
19. See generally, JOHN ALAN APPLEMAN & JEAN APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND
PRACTICE § 1675 (1967).
20. See, e.g., Wrightsman v. Hardware Dealers Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 147 S.E.2d 860 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1966)(finding the subrogation provision of a contract to be null and void because it violated
the common law principal that prohibited the assignment of a personal injury claim); Nationwide
Mut. Ins. Co. v. DeJane, 326 N.E.2d 701 (Ohio Ct. App. 1974)(denying subrogation of medical
expenses because it violated the res judicata principle that forbids one from splitting a cause of
action involving a personal injury claim).
21. See, e.g., Smith v. Travelers Ins. Co., 362 N.E.2d 264 (Ohio 1977)(effectively
overruling DeJane, 326 N.E.2d 701 (Ohio Ct. App. 1974)).
22. Baron, supra note 18, at 583.
23. APPLEMAN, supra note 19, § 1675. "Subrogation, which developed as an equitable
doctrine, facilitates an adjustment of rights to avoid unjust enrichment in many types of situations
by substituting one person or entity in place of another in regard to some claim or right the
second person or entity has against a third party." Id.
24. See, e.g., Smith, 362 N.E.2d at 266 (holding that to preclude subrogation would permit
an injured party to recover twice for medical expenses); Lattimer v. Boucher, 458 A.2d 528 (N.J.
Super. Ct. 1983).
25. See KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 16, § 3.10(a)(1); see also, Association Hosp. Serv. v.
Pusilnik, 439 A.2d 1149 (Pa. 1981).
26. Baron, supra note 18, at 582.
27. 77 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 1-1603 (1993).
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subrogation when an insured party realizes a recovery in tort from a third
party responsible for his injuries.28
A. Subrogation under the Pennsylvania No-Fault Motor Vehicle
Insurance Act
In 1974, the Pennsylvania Legislature enacted the Pennsylvania No-
Fault Motor Vehicle Insurance Act (No-Fault Act).29 The purpose of
the No-Fault Act was "to establish at reasonable cost to the purchaser of
insurance, a statewide system of prompt and adequate basic loss
benefits["] for motor vehicle accident victims and the survivors of
deceased victims."'" As its name implies, the No-Fault Act attempted
to accomplish its objective by compensating virtually all motor vehicle
accident victims for economic losses on a first party basis32 regardless
of fault. 33  Everyone was to receive unlimited medical benefits and to
recover a substantial amount in work loss. 34  In exchange for these
28. 77 PA. STAT. ANN. § 671 (Supp. 1985). Section 319 of the Workers' Compensation
Act provides:
Where the compensable injury is caused in whole or in part by the act or omission
of a third party, the employer shall be subrogated to the right of the employee, his
personal representative, his estate or his dependents, against such third party to the
extent of the compensation payable under this article by the employer; reasonable
attorney's fees and other proper disbursements incurred in obtaining a recovery or in
effecting a compromise settlement shall be prorated between the employer and
employee, his personal representative, his estate or his dependents. The employer
shall pay that proportion of the attorney's fees and other proper disbursements that
the amount of compensation paid or payable at the time of recovery or settlement
bears to the total recovery or settlement. Any recovery against such third person in
excess of the compensation theretofore paid by the employer shall be paid forthwith
to the employee, his personal representative, his estate or his dependents, and shall
be treated as an advance payment by the employer on account of any future
installments of compensation.
Id.
29. 40 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1009.101-701 . (Purdon Supp. 1983-84) (repealed 1983).
30. Basic loss benefits are defined as:
... benefits provided in accordance with [the No-Fault Act] for the net loss
sustained by a victim, subject to any applicable limitations, exclusions, deductibles,
waiting periods, disqualifications, or other terms and conditions provided or
authorized in accordance with this act. Basic loss benefits do not include benefits
for net loss sustained by an operator or passenger of a motorcycle.
Id. at § 1009.103 (Supp. 1983-84) (repealed 1983).
31. Id. at § 1009.102(b) (Supp. 1983-84) (repealed 1983).
32. Under first party insurance, "the insured makes a direct claim against his or her insurer
when the covered contingency,... occurs." W. SHERNOFF, ET AL., INSURANCE BAD FAITH
LITIGATION § 4.01 (1984).
33. For a thorough overview of the No-Fault Act, see DAVID S. SHRAGER ET AL., THE
PENNSYLVANIA NO-FAULT MOTOR VEHICLE INSURANCE ACT, (1979).




extraordinary benefits, the Act restricted a victim's right to recover in
tort. 5  Supporters of the No-Fault Act assured the public that tort
restrictions would result in reductions in insurance premiums, and they
incorporated this promise into the Act.36  Unfortunately, the No-Fault
Act failed miserably." The Act was complex and many of its
provisions were conflicting or ambiguous." To interpret these
provisions, the courts turned to the Act's purpose to justify their
decisions.39 As a result, several of these decisions expanded the scope of
the benefits recoverable by accident victims.4" Instead of reducing
consumer insurance premiums, the Act caused them to rise
35. Id. at § 1009.301 (repealed 1983).
36. Id. at § 1009.504 (promising to reduce premiums by 15 percent) (repealed 1983). See
generally, JAMES R. RONCA ET AL., PENNSYLVANIA MOTOR VEHICLE INSURANCE: AN ANALYSIS
OF THE FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY LAW, § 1:2 (1986).
37. Bernard L. Webb & Claude C. Lilly, No-Fault--The Record: Promise versus
Performance, Myth versus Reality (1983). The authors concluded that:
it is clear that no-fault automobile insurance has failed to provide the reductions in
insurance costs promised by its prompters. In fact, with the exception of add-on
laws, no-fault insurance has brought rapid increase in insurance costs. The interests
of the people of Pennsylvania would be served best by the repeal of the No-Fault
Law and return to a tort system or by the adoption of an add-on no-fault-law.
Id.
38. The Pennsylvania Superior Court noted the complex nature of the Act in Heffner v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 401 A.2d 1160 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979) as follows:
At the outset we caution anyone who embarks on the high seas of Pennsylvania's
No-Fault Motor Vehicle Insurance Act not to do so without a good compass, a
knowledge of reefs and storms and plenty of food and water. Any attempt to
choose an alternate route by land in an effort to unlock the secrets of the Act will
encounter mazes of paths, pitfalls, underbrush and dead ends. In attempting to
explain what should be the rudimentary "work loss" compensatory scheme, no less
an experienced guide than the Pennsylvania Bar Institute was forced to conclude that
the Act is impenetrable.
Id. at 1161.
39. See Howe v. Harleysville Ins. Co., 459 A.2d 412 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983).
40. Freeze v. Donegal Ins. Co., 470 A.2d 958 (Pa. 1983)(awarding postmortem work loss
benefits to the estate of deceased victims even though the victim was not employed or was a child
at the time of the accident); Chester v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 448 A.2d 1080 (Pa.
1982)(holding that dependency was not required for survivors loss and postmortem work loss
benefits); Tubner v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 436 A.2d 621 (Pa. 1981)(awarding uninsured
motorist benefits through the Assigned Claims Plan).
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dramatically.41 It was these rising consumer costs that principally lead
to the Act's repeal on February 12, 1984.42
Under the No-Fault Act, subrogation for Workers' Compensation
benefits was somewhat limited.43 The No-Fault Act abolished the
subrogation rights granted to the employer under section 319 of the
Workmen's Compensation Act 44 to the extent of the employer's share
of the first $15,000 of wage loss benefits. 45  Beyond the first $15,000
of wage loss payable, a subrogation claim for recovery of benefits
payable under the Workmen's Compensation Act was not affected by the
No-Fault Act.46
B. The Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law
In October of 1984, the Legislature enacted the Motor Vehicle
Financial Responsibility Law (MVFRL)47 as the successor to the No-
Fault Act. Proponents hail the law as an "innovative auto insurance
system designed to provide basic minimum protection for accident
victims at lower costs without restricting the right to sue."48 Under the
MVFRL, auto insurance is no longer mandatory in the strict sense;
instead, a vehicle owner is required to demonstrate financial
responsibility49 at the time of registration.5" Financial responsibility
41. Sen. Edward Holl, Floor Comments, in PENNSYLVANIA MOTOR VEHICLE INSURANCE:
AN ANALYSIS OF THE FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY LAW, at 352 (Ronca et al., 1986)(October 4,
1983).
No-Fault has failed to provide the consumer with the benefits that it promised. It
has not been able to deliver increased benefits complemented by reduced insurance
costs. It has not worked in Pennsylvania where the cost of no-fault benefits has
soared 875 percent; it has not worked in other states.... An expensive benefit
package may be desirable, but if consumers cannot afford the benefit package, then
it is worthless. That is what we have in Pennsylvania with more than 30 percent of
our motorist uninsured.
Id.
42. Act of February 12, 1984, 1984 Pa. Laws. 11 (1984).
43. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1009.111 (1974)(repealed 1983).
44. See supra note 28.
45. Id.
46. Vespaziani v. Insana, 462 A.2d 669 (Pa. 1983).
47. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1701-1798 (1984). Eleven other states have comparative
laws. See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 28-1251 to 28-1260 (1993); ARK. CODE. ANN. § 27-13-102
(Michie 1993); CAL. VEHICLE CODE §§ 16430-16436 (West 1993); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§
42-7-101 to 42-7-510 (West 1993); DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 21, § 2901 et seq. (1993); FLA. STAT.
ANN. §§ 324.011-324.251 (West 1993); HAW. REV. STAT. § 268-116 (1993); IND. CODE ANN. §
9-25-2-3, 9-25-4-1 et seq. (West 1993); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 169.791 to 169.796 (West 1993);
MO. STAT. ANN. §§ 303.010 to 303.370 (Vernon 1993); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 39:6b-I to 39:6B-3
(West 1993).
48. James R. Ronca, Neiv insurance Law effective Oct. 1, PA. L.J. REP., Feb. 20, 1984, at I.
49. The Act defines Financial Responsibility as "the ability to respond in damages for
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can be demonstrated in one of three ways. First, the vehicle owner may
purchase a liability insurance policy." Second, a vehicle owner may be
designated a self-insurer by filing evidence of financial responsibility with
the Department of Transportation. 2 Third, an owner may self-certify
financial responsibility in a manner acceptable with the Department of
Transportation. 3
1. Section 1720: Subrogation under the MVFRL. --Section 1720 of
the MVFRL eliminated the insurer's right to subrogation. It provides that
"in actions arising out of the maintenance or use of a motor vehicle,[4]
there shall be no right of subrogation or reimbursement from a claimant's
tort recovery with respect to workers' compensation benefits . ... ""
Since the phrase "maintenance or use of a motor vehicle" has been
liberally construed,56 the insurer's right to subrogation is precluded not
only where the injuries are caused by a negligent driver, but also where
the injuries arise from a defective motor vehicle5 7 or a hazard on the
highway. 8
Despite the clear language of section 1720, insurers argued against
its application.59 In Walters v. Kampi,6 ° the insurer contended that by
disallowing subrogation it made a "double recovery" possible for the
liability on account of accidents arising out of the maintenance or use of a motor vehicle in the
amount of $15,000 because of injury to one person in any one accident, in the amount of $30,000
because of injury to two or more persons in any one accident and in the amount of $5,000
because of damage to property of others in any one accident" 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1702
(Supp. 1993).
50. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1305 (1984).
51. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1711 (Supp. 1993).
52. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1787 (Supp. 1993).
53. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1782 (Supp. 1993).
54. The phrase "use or maintenance of a motor vehicle" was deliberately chosen because it
follows the language of the No-Fault Act and has a long history of use in vehicle insurance law.
See Larry D. Scheafer, Annotation, Automobile Liability Insurance: What are Accidents or
Injuries "Arising Out of Ownership, Maintenance, or Use" of Insured Vehicle, 15 A.L.R. 4TH 10
(1982).
55. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1720 (Supp. 1993)(emphasis added); see supra note 10 for
complete text of the statute.
56. Schweitzer v. Aetna Life & Casualty Ins. Co., 452 A.2d 735 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982)
(holding there must be some causal connection between the maintenance and use of the vehicle
and the injury in order for an injured victim to recover benefits.); see also, Varner v. Nationwide
Mut. Ins. Co., 489 A.2d 918 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985)(holding that injuries resulting from medical
malpractice committed during the course of treating injuries from a motor vehicle accident "arose
out of the use of a motor vehicle.").
57. See RONCA ET AL., supra note 36, § 3:5.
58. Walters v. Kamppi, 545 A.2d 975 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1988), appeal denied, 544 A.2d
975 (Pa. 1988).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 977.
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employee.6 The insurer further argued that when the legislature
repealed the No-Fault Act in an attempt to cut costs, it could not have
intended to enact a provision in the new MVFRL, which would also
allow a "double recovery."62  The court was unpersuaded by this
argument. It stated that since section 1720 was "free and clear from all
ambiguity,"63 the court must decline to delve into the intent of the
legislature in enacting the MVFRL.64
Even though section 1720 was strictly applied in Pennsylvania, the
Pennsylvania Superior Court permitted an insurer a right of subrogation
when applying the laws of another state. 65 In Davish v. Gidley,66 an
employee was injured in a work-related automobile accident within the
state of Pennsylvania. The employer was incorporated in New Jersey and
had its principal place of business there.67 Following the accident, the
employee sought workers' compensation benefits under the New Jersey
Workers' Compensation Act, which provided compensation for disability
and all medical expenses. 6' After recovering his New Jersey workers'
compensation benefits, the plaintiff filed suit in Pennsylvania against the
tortfeasor.69  The workers' compensation carrier sought to intervene in
the suit to protect its statutory right to subrogation guaranteed under the
New Jersey Law.70  The court held that the injured employee's tort
recovery would be subject to subrogation because the law of the state
where he received his workers' compensation benefits allowed
subrogation. 7' The decision was based on a conflict of law analysis, the
rationale being that the state where the workers' compensation is
regulated is the state with more significant contacts regarding workers'
compensation." Ironically, the court noted that the employer made his
own choice of law when he elected to collect workers' compensation
benefits under New Jersey law.73 Had he picked Pennsylvania as the
61. Id.
62. Walters, 545 A.2d at 977.
63. This analysis is based on Section 1921(b) of the Statutory Construction Act of 1972
which states "[w]hen the words of a statute are free and clear from all ambiguity, the letter of it
is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit." I PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §
1921(b) (1992).
64. Walters, 545 A.2d at 977.
65. Davish v. Gidley, 611 A.2d 1307 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 1308.
68. Id.
69. Davish, 611 A.2d at 1309.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 1310.
72. Id. See also, Allstate v. McFadden, 595 A.2d 1277 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991).
73. Davish, 611 A.2d at 1310.
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site for his workers' compensation benefits, the insurer would have been
barred from subrogating,74
2. 1722 under MVFRL.--Since the insurer has no right of
subrogation with respect to workers' compensation benefits under the
MVFRL, the claimant can potentially obtain "double recovery" by
recovering damages in tort from the negligent tortfeasor. However, the
General Assembly prevented this possibility by enacting section 1722. 75
It provides that the insured, "[i]n any action for damages against a
tortfeasor... shall be precluded from recovering the amount of benefits
paid or payable under . . .workers' compensation ... .,,76 The
plaintiff-employee can seek compensation from the tortfeasor only for
such injuries not recoverable under workers' compensation.77 Thus, in
Postorino v. Schrope,78 a pedestrian who was injured in a motor vehicle
accident in the course of his employment and whose medical expenses
and lost wages were paid through workers' compensation was foreclosed
from introducing such evidence in his tort action under section 1722 of
the MVFRL.79
In essence, sections 1720 and 1722 work in tandem to prevent the
employee from receiving a "double recovery." Section 1720 of the
MVFRL provides that no right of subrogation or reimbursement exists
from a claimant's tort recovery with respect to workers' compensation
benefits.80 In return, section 1722 precludes workers from recovering
compensation for benefits already paid under workers' compensation."
74. Id.
75. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1722 (Supp. 1993) (repealed 1993). For the text of section
1722 see supra note 10.
76. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1722 (Supp. 1993); see supra note 10 for complete text of
the statute.
77. Injuries not recoverable under workers' compensation include, for example, pain and
suffering and loss of consortium. John J. Coffey & Daniel V. DiLoretto, Changing the Rules:
Motor Vehicle Injury Actions Take a Different Turn under New Workers' Comp Act, 16 PA. L. J.
33, Aug. 23, 1993, at 5.
78. 736 F. Supp. 639 (E.D. Pa. 1990).
79. Although it was not within the context of workers' compensation, a similar interpretation
of section 1722 was found in Wagner by Wagner v. York Hosp., 608 A.2d 496 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1992) (holding that a recipient under the Catastrophic Loss Fund created under the MVFRL could
not plead or introduce into evidence the amount of medical expenses which were paid by the
Catastrophic Loss Fund, regardless of the nature of the claim or identity of the tortfeasor).
80. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1720 (Supp. 1993) (repealed 1993).
81. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1722 (Supp. 1993) (repealed 1993).
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III. Present State of Subrogation as Affected by the Repeal of
Sections 1720 & 1722
The 1993 Amendments to the Pennsylvania Workers' Compensation
Law (the "1993 Amendments")82 repealed sections 1720 and 1722 of
the MVFRL insofar as they relate to workers' compensation payments. 3
The Workers' Compensation insurer now has a full right of
subrogation" under section 319 of the Pennsylvania Workers'
Compensation Act. 5 Under section 319, insurer subrogation rights are
conditioned upon (1) a compensable injury being caused in part by the
act or omission of a third-party, and (2) a recovery against the third-
party.86  Thus, where an employee injured in a work-related motor
vehicle accident initiates a cause of action against the third-party
tortfeasor, the insurer has a vested interest in that action. 7 In such a
situation, the insurer is obligated to pay a pro-rata share of counsel fees
and litigation expenses incurred by the employee. 8
Section 319, however, does not confer upon the employer or its
insurer a cause of action against the third-party in its own right.89 If the
employee does not bring a cause of action himself, all subrogation rights
are not lost. The compensation insurer can bring an action against the
tortfeasor in the name of the injured employee by either joining the
employer as a party or as a "use" plaintiff.9 ° If third-party liability is
82. Act of July 2, 1993, Act. No. 1993-44, 1993 Pa. Legis. Serv. 1 (Purdon).
83. Act of July 2, 1993, Act No. 1993-44, 1993 Pa. Legis. Serv. I (Purdon). The
modification of sections 1720 and 1722 is effective August 31, 1993. Id. at § 27.
84. Winfree v. Philadelphia Electric Co., 554 A.2d 485 (Pa. 1989) (holding that an
employer's right to subrogation is absolute and may not be challenged on the basis that the
employer was partially responsible or at fault for the employee's injury).
85. McDaniel v. Rexnord, Inc., 537 A.2d 365 (Pa. 1988)(In spite of the language of section
319, 77 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 671, stating that the employer is subrogated, where the
workers' compensation insurer has paid benefits, the insurer and not the employer is subrogated
to the employee's rights against the party).
86. Olin Corp. (Plastics Division) v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board, 324 A.2d
813, 817 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1974); see also, Travelers Ins. Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indem.
Co., 294 A.2d 913 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1972).
87. See Dale Mfg. Co. v. Bressi, 421 A.2d 653 (Pa. 1980)(finding that employer was
entitled to subrogation out of monies obtained in a third-party medical malpractice action where
the negligent medical treatment was provided in connection with the original work-related injury).
88. Rollins Outdoor Advertising et al. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board & Maas,
487 A.2d 794 (Pa. 1985).
89. Reliance Ins. Co. v. Richmond Machine Co. et al., 455 A.2d 686 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983);
Scalise v. F.M. Venzie & Co., 152 A. 90 (Pa. 1930); Moltz v. Sherwood Bros., Inc., 176 A. 842
(Pa. 1935). But see Nationwide Ins. Co. v. Rigid Ply Rafters, Inc., 27 Lebanon Co. L.J. 89
(1989)(holding that a workers' compensation carrier can assert a direct action against an allegedly
negligent third-party to recover workers' compensation payments made to an injured worker).
90. Reliance Ins. Co. v. Richmond Machine Co., 455 A.2d 686, 689 (Pa. Super Ct. 1983);
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established and an award is granted to the employee, the insurer may
recover through subrogation9' the amount it has paid in workers'
compensation benefits.92
In accordance with the repeal of section 1720, the 1993 Amendments
to the Workers' Compensation Act also repealed section 1722 of the
MVFRL.93 In tort actions, an employee who is injured in the scope of
employment and who has received workers' compensation benefits may
now plead, prove and recover all medical expenses and work loss paid by
the workers' compensation carrier.94 The repeal of 1722, with respect
to workers' compensation, removes what would have created a serious
ambiguity had only 1720 been repealed. 9 If section 1722 had remained
intact, it would have entitled the insurer to subrogate the amount of work
loss and medical expenses paid to the employee without allowing the
employee to recover those amounts in tort.9 6
see also, Moltz v. Sherwood Bros., Inc. 176 A. 842, 843.
91. There are four separate methods for determining subrogation under the Workers'
Compensation Act Rollins Outdoor Advertising et al. v. Workmens' Compensation Appeal
Board & Maas, 487 A.2d 794 (Pa. 1985); Dasconio v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board
(Aeronica Inc. and Continental Ins. Co.), 559 A.2d 92 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1989); Bell Tel. Co. of
Pa. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board (Artuch), 562 A.2d 427 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1989);
Gold Star Serv., Inc. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board & Tullio, 342 A.2d 459 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1975). For an excellent summary of the various methods for calculating
subrogation in formula form, see Hon. David E. Craig, Subrogation Summary, in PENNSYLVANIA
WORKERS' COMPENSATION 1992, at A-105-A-1Il (PBI Practice & Procedure Course Handbook
Series Pub. No. 669, 1992). Of the four methods, only one is reflected in a Bureau of Workers'
Compensation Form. BUREAU OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION, P.A. DEP'T OF LABOR AND
INDUSTRY, FORM No. 380, THIRD PARTY SETrLEMENT AGREEMENT (1993). If this "Bureau
Method" is followed, the calculations are not likely to be reversed on appeal by the Workers'
Compensation Referee. Pendleton v. Workmens' Compensation Appeal Board (Congeleum
Corp.), 625 A.2d 187 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1993).
92. Scalise v. F.M. Venzie & Co., 152 A. 90 (Pa. 1930); Moltz v. Sherwood Bros., Inc.,
176 A. 842 (Pa. 1935).
93. Act of July 2, 1993, Act. No. 1993-44, 1993 Pa. Legis. Serv. 1, § 25(b) (Purdon).
94. Fred H. Halt, Changes in the Auto Act on Subrogation and UMUIM Insurance for
Work-Related Auto Accidents and New Offsets/Limitations, in The New Workers' Compensation
Act: Comp in the Nineties and Beyond, Fall 1993, at 26. (available from the PA Trial Lawyers
Assoc.).
95. Id. at 29.
96. See, e.g, Davish, 611 A.2d at 1310.
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IV. Uninsured and Underinsured Motorist Protection In Pennsylvania:
An Overview
The second area of the MVFRL affected by the Workers'
Compensation reform is uninsured 97  and underinsured9" motorist
coverage.
A. Historical Background
Pennsylvania made its first attempt to solve the problem of
uninsured motorists99 through the enactment of the Uninsured Motorist
Act.'00  The Act requires that all motor vehicle insurance policies
contain provisions for uninsured motorist coverage.'0 ' Specifically, the
minimum required limits of underinsured coverage are $15,000 per
person and $30,000 in total coverage for two or more persons injured in
the same accident."0 2 In construing the Act's intent, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court stated that the Act was "designed to give monetary
protection to that ever changing and tragically large group of persons
who, while lawfully using the highways themselves, suffer grave injury
through the negligent use of those highways by others.' 0 3  The
Pennsylvania courts, however, were unwilling to apply the protection
afforded through the Uninsured Motorist Act to situations where the
tortfeasor had some insurance available, but in insufficient amounts to
cover the injured party's damages.0 4 A tortfeasor who has insufficient
insurance to cover the plaintiff's damages is considered to be
underinsured not uninsured. In certain situations, the distinction actually
resulted in higher recoveries for victims injured by uninsured motorists
than for those injured by underinsured motorists. 1I0 Notably, the
97. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
98. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
99. See generally, Linda L. Rovder, "In Good Hands" or "Bad Faith?" An Insurer's
Failure to Waive Subrogation Rights in Pennsylvania Underinsured Motorist Cases, 91 DICK. L.
REv. 981 (1987).
100. Act of Aug. 14, 1963, No. 433, § 1, 1963 Pa. Laws 909 (codified as amended at 40
PA. STAT. ANN. § 2000 (Purdon 1992)).
101. 40 PA. STAT. ANN. § 2000(a) (Purdon 1992).
102. Id.
103. Harleysville Mut. Cas. Co. v. Blumling, 241 A.2d 112, 115 (Pa. 1968) (quoting Katz v.
American Motorist Ins. Co., 53 Cal. Rptr. 669 (Cal. App. 1966)).
104. White v. Concord Mut. Ins. Co., 442 A.2d 713 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982) (allowing no
uninsured motorist recovery where the tortfeasor carried the statutory minimum which was
reduced by multiple plaintiffs).
105. See, e.g., Gorton v. Reliance Ins. Co., 391 A.2d 1219, 1223 (N.J. 1978) (recognizing




Uninsured Motorist Act has not been repealed; it remains in effect except
where its terms are inconsistent with the MVFRL1
0 6
The MVFRL, as enacted in 1984, eliminated the distinction between
the uninsured and the underinsured motorist protection by requiring that
all automobile insurance policies provide protection from both uninsured
and underinsured motorists."0 7 However, the 1990 Amendments to the
MVFRL"' s made the purchase of uninsured and underinsured coverage
optional.0 9  Therefore, if an insured chooses not to purchase
uninsured/underinsured coverage, the insured would not be protected for
losses and damages suffered at the hand of an uninsured/underinsured
motorist.
Additionally, the MVFRL requires that uninsured/underinsured
motorist protection be made available with limits of at least $100,000 per
person and $300,000 per accident." 0  Although these limits are
substantially higher than the $15,000 and $30,000 initially required under
the Uninsured Motorist Act,' the law requires only that the insurance
industry make these limits available."2
The issue of uninsured/underinsured motorist benefits is further
complicated when entwined with workers' compensation. Early decisions
concentrated on who should pay uninsured/underinsured motorist benefits
for persons injured in work-related accidents--the employer's auto
insurance carrier, the employee's auto insurance carrier, or no one.
Unfortunately for the practitioner, the answer has varied with
considerable frequency over the past twenty years.
Under the Uninsured Motorist Act, the answer to this inquiry was no
one. In Lewis v. School Dist. of Philadelphia,' the Pennsylvania
106. Act of Feb. 12, 1984, No. 1i, § 8(c) 1984 Pa. Laws 26.
107. 75 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 173 i(a) (amended by Act of Feb. 7, 1990, No. 6, § 9, 1990
Pa. Laws 11). The statute provides in pertinent part:
§ 1731. Scope and amount of coverage
(a) General rule. - No motor vehicle liability insurance policy shall be delivered or issued
for delivery in this Commonwealth, with respect to any motor vehicle registered or
principally garaged in the Commonwealth, unless uninsured and underinsured motorist
coverages are provided therein or supplemental thereto in amount equal to the bodily
injury liability coverage except as provided in section 1734 (relating to request for lower or
higher limits of coverage).
Id. (emphasis added).
108. Act of Feb. 7, 1990, No. 6, 1990 Pa. Laws 11.
109. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1731 (Supp. 1993) (repealed 1993). For complete text of
§ 173 1(a) see infra note 179.
110. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §1792 (Supp. 1993).
111. See supra note 101.
112. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §1792 (Supp. 1993).
113. 538 A.2d 862 (Pa. 1988); see also, Azpell v. Old Republic Ins. Co., 555 A.2d 168 (Pa.
1111
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Supreme Court held that a claim by an employee for uninsured motorist
benefits against his employer under the Uninsured Motorist Act was
barred by section 303(a) of the Workmen's Compensation Act." 4 Jerry
Lewis was employed by the Philadelphia School District as a bus
driver. The School District was self-insured as to motor vehicle
liability and workers' compensation claims." 6 On May 26, 1982,
Lewis was injured in an auto accident within the scope of his
employment." 7 The driver of the other vehicle was an uninsured
motorist."' Since Lewis's injuries were incurred within the course of
his employment, he received workmen's compensation benefits from his
employer." 9  Subsequently, Lewis demanded that the School District
pay him additional money for pain and suffering pursuant to the
mandatory uninsured motorist coverage required by the Uninsured
Motorist Act.
20
In determining whether the Uninsured Motorist Act or the
Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Act controlled, the court
essentially employed a statutory construction analysis. First, the court
found that nothing on the face of the Uninsured Motorist Act'
2'
Super. Ct. 1989) rev'd on other grounds, 584 A.2d 950 (1991) (following Lewis, the Superior
Court held that the exclusive remedy of the Workmen's Compensation Act precluded an
employee from recovering uninsured motorist benefits from an employer's auto insurance carrier).
114. 77 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 481(a). Section 303(a) provides that:
(a) The liability of an employer under this act shall be exclusive and in place of
any and all other liability to such employees, his legal representative, husband or
wife, parents, dependents, next of kin or anyone otherwise entitled to damages in
any action at law or otherwise on account of any injury or death as defined in
section 301(c)(1) and (2) or occupational disease as defined in section 108.
Id. The appeal in Lewis arose from the court's consolidation of three separate actions for
damages based on the Uninsured Motorist Act. However, for purposes of this discussion, review





119. Lewis, 538 A.2d'at 863.
120. Id. The claim was based on the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision in Modesta v.
Southern Pennsylvania Trans. Auth., 469 A.2d 1019 (Pa. 1982) (holding that self-insurers have a
legal duty to provide uninsured motorist coverage mandated under the Uninsured Motorist Act;
overruling Johnson v. Yellow Cab, 317 A.2d 245 (Pa. 1974)).
121. 40 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2000(a). Section l(a) of the Uninsured Motorist Act
provides in pertinent part:
No motor vehicle liability policy of insurance against loss resulting from liability
imposed by law for bodily injury or death suffered by any person arising out of the
ownership, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle shall be delivered or issued for
delivery in this State with respect to any motor vehicle registered or principally
garaged in this State, unless coverage is provided therein or supplemental thereto in
limits for bodily injury or death as are fixed from time to time by the General
1112
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precluded an employee from making a claim under his employer's policy
for uninsured motorist coverage.'22  Thus, the only bar to an
employee's recovery would be a contravening legislative provision,'23
namely the Workmen's Compensation Act.
According to section 303(a) of the Workmen's Compensation
Act, 24 the workers' compensation law is the employee's exclusive
remedy against his employer for an injury sustained in the scope of
employment. 125  Such is the traditional quid pro quo that employers
receive for being subjected to a no-fault system of compensation for
injured workers.'26 Since the claimant in this case was clearly within
the scope of his employment when injured, section 303(a) applied. And,
since section 303(a) was more recently enacted than the Uninsured
Motorist Act (enacted in 1963), it prevailed under section 1936 of the
Statutory Construction Act of 1972.127 Consequently, employees were
not entitled to recover uninsured motorist benefits from their employer's
automobile insurance policy. This prohibition against the employee
recovering uninsured motorist benefits has been entitled the "Workers'
Compensation Defense.'
28
Assembly . for the protection of persons insured thereunder who are legally
entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles
because of bodily injury, sickness or disease, including but death resulting therefrom
Id.
122. Lewis, 538 A.2d at 866.
123. Id.
124. See supra note 114.
125. See Poyser v. Newman & Co., 522 A.2d 548 (Pa. 1987)(interpreting section 303(a) of
the 1974 amendments to the Workmen's Compensation Act); see also Kline Arden H. Verner
Co., 469 A.2d 158 (Pa. 1983).
126. Lewis, 538 A.2d 867; Socha v. Metz, 123 A.2d 837, 839-40 (Pa. 1956).
By virtue of the [Workmen's] Compensation Act, an employee's common law right
to damages for injuries suffered in the course of his employment as a result of his
employer's negligence is completely surrendered in exchange for he exclusive
statutory right of the employee to compensation for all injuries, regardless of
negligence ....
Id.
127. Section 1936 of the Statutory Construction Act of 1972 provides that "[w]henever the
provisions of two or more statutes enacted finally by different General Assemblies are
irreconcilable, the latest in date offinal enactment shall prevail." 1 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §
1936 (1992) (emphasis added).
128. See James C. Haggerty, Workers' Compensation Reform: The Impact Upon Cases
Under the Financial Responsibility Law, CouNTEPOINT, October 1993, at 1; see also Leflar v.
Gulf Creek Industrial Park No.2, 515 A.2d 875 (Pa. 1986) (indicating that so strong is the
principle of exclusivity found in § 303(a) of the Workmen's Compensation Act that it is deemed
a nonwaivable defense, even when not timely raised).
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B. Uninsured and Underinsured Motorist Protection Under the
MVFRL
1. Purchasers of Motor Vehicle Insurance Coverage.--The
enactment of the MVFRL reinstated the employee's ability to recover
uninsured/underinsured benefits from his employer's automobile insurance
policies.'29 Specifically, section 1735 limited the application of the
exclusive remedy rule in uninsured and underinsured motorist cases.
30
Despite the clear language of the provision, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court was called upon to interpret the statute. In Selected Risks
Insurance Co. v. Thompson,' 3' the court held that section 1735 of the
MVFRL clearly permits recovery from uninsured/underinsured coverage
policies without a reduction or "set-off' for payments made under
workers' compensation.
The factual circumstances surrounding Selected Risks' were
similar to those found in Lewis.' Selected Risks Insurance Co. (S.R.I)
issued a comprehensive automobile insurance policy to the New Galilee
Volunteer Fire Department covering the six vehicles owned and operated
by the department.33 As mandated, the policy provided for uninsured
motorist coverage.3 3 Thompson, a volunteer fireman, was injured in
an automobile collision with an uninsured motorist while responding to
a fire alarm.' Unable to return to full time employment, Thompson
received workers' compensation benefits.'37 Thereafter, he filed a
claim for uninsured motorist benefits under his employer's auto insurance
policy
38
129. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1735 (Supp. 1993) (repealed 1993). For the complete text
of section 1735 see supra note 10.
130. 75 PA. STAT. CONS. ANN. §1735 (Supp. 1993) (repealed 1993). The statute provided
in pertinent part that "[t]he coverages required by this subchapter shall not be made subject to an
exclusion or reduction in amount because of any workers' compensation benefits payable as a
result of the same injury." Id.
131. 552 A.2d 1382 (Pa. 1989).
132. Id.
133. 538 A.2d 862 (Pa. 1988).






The issue 139 as to whether S.R.I. should be permitted to reduce
uninsured motorist benefits by the amount of workers' compensation
benefits received arose by virtue of a contractual provision.4 contained
in the uninsured motorist endorsement. 4' The provision, also known
as a "set-off' provision, provided that any amount payable under
uninsured motorist insurance shall be reduced by all sums paid under
workers' compensation.'42 After articulating several reasons why the
contractual provision was contrary to public policy, the court stated that
section 1735 of the MVFRL clearly prohibits such set-offs by insurance
companies."4  Relying upon the Selected Risks decision, the
Pennsylvania Superior Court has consistently held that injured employees
can recover uninsured/underinsured benefits through their employers'
policies. "'
2. Self-Insured Employers.--An exception to the rule emerged in
situations where the employer was self-insured. 45 The Pennsylvania
139. Also at issue in this case was whether Thompson, as a member of an unincorporated
volunteer fire association, should be permitted to stack the uninsured motorist coverages provided
under the automobile policy issued in the name if the association. The court decided that
Thompson could not stack uninsured motorist coverages. Selected Risks, 552 A.2d at 1387.
140. The contract provided in pertinent part:
E. OUR LIMIT OF LIABILITY
1. Regardless of the number of covered autos, insurers, claims made or vehicles
involved in the accident, the most we will pay for all damages resulting from any
one accident is the limit of UNINSURED MOTORIST INSURANCE shown in the
declarations.
2. Any amount payable under this insurance shall be reduced by: a. All sums paid
or payable under any workers' compensation, disability or similar law...
Id. at 1387-88.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 1387.
143. Id. at 1388. The court noted that since this act took affect after the incident at bar,
section 1735 was not controlling. However, the court found that it was indicative of what the
legislature perceived as the appropriate policy to follow in dealing with insurance set-offs.
144. See Chatham v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co., 570 A.2d 509 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989), affirmed
605 A.2d 329 (Pa. 1992) (holding that the MVFRL, which was promulgated subsequent to the
Workmen's Compensation Act, took precedence over the Workmen's Compensation Act and
accordingly, the employee was entitled to recover both workmen's compensation benefits and
uninsured motorist benefits through the employer's auto insurance policy); Ferry v. Liberty Mut.
Ins. Co., 573 A.2d 610 (Pa. Super. CL 1990) (holding that the MVFRL provides a separate
source of recovery for employees injured by uninsured motorists that is independent of the
exclusive remedy for work-related accidents provided under the Workmen's Compensation Act);
see also Odom v. Carolina Cas. Ins. Co., 575 A.2d 631 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990), affirmed 604 A.2d
1023 (Pa. 1992).
145. In order to qualify as a self-insured, a registrant must file evidence of reliable financial
resources with the Department of Transportation. The resources must be sufficient to: 1) provide
the required first-party benefits under sections 1711, 1712 and 1715; 2) make payments to satisfy
any judgments as required under section 1774; and 3) provide uninsured motorist coverage in
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Supreme Court, in Hackenburg v. Southeastern Pennsylvania
Transportation Authority,'46 held that employees were barred from
recovering uninsured motorist benefits under the MVFRL from self-
insured employers. In making the distinction for the self-insured
employers, the court determined that "coverages required by this
subchapter" encompassed only those coverages offered in insurance
policies. 47 Therefore, the court reasoned that section 1735 addressed
only the limitations placed on insurance companies in writing insurance
policies for uninsured and underinsured motorists. 41 Consequently,
section 1735 does not apply to self-insured employers because, as their
name implies, they have not purchased automobile insurance polices.'
49
Therefore, the court reasoned that section 1735 does not require a self-
insured employer to pay an employee uninsured motorists benefits in
addition to workers' compensation benefits. 5 '
As a result of the Hackenburg decision, 5' a claimant's ability to
recover uninsured/underinsured benefits through his employer is
contingent upon whether the employer is covered through a commercial
insurance policy or self-insurance."' There can be no valid policy
reason for such an arbitrary distinction, nor is it feasible to believe that
the legislature intended such a result.'
C. The MVFRL and Section 173 7
On February 7, 1990, the General Assembly enacted section
173714 of the MVFRL to further clarify the elimination of the workers'
compensation defense in both uninsured and underinsured motorist
accordance with section 1744. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1787. Notice that while section 1787
requires the self-insurer to provide uninsured benefits, it makes no requirement to provide
underinsured benefits. See Hackenberg v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Auth., 586
A.2d 879, 882 (Pa. 1991); see also Jenkins v. City of Philadelphia, 621 A.2d 689 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1993).
146. 586 A.2d 879 (Pa. 1991).
147. By its own language, section 1735 only applies to subchapter C which includes
persons, employers and others who have purchased insurance policies. Westbrook v. Robbins,
611 A.2d 749 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992).




152. Id. at 885 (dissenting opinion).
153. Hackenberg, 586 A.2d at 886.
154. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1737 (Supp. 1993) (repealed 1993). The statute provided,
in pertinent part, that "[n]otwithstanding anything ... in the Pennsylvania Workmen's
Compensation Act, no employee who is otherwise entitled shall be precluded from recovery of
uninsured or underinsured motorist benefits from an employer's motor vehicle policy... Id.
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cases.15 However, this provision still failed to provide
uninsured/underinsured benefits for the injured worker whose employer
was self-insured. 56  Thus, the distinction between employers who
purchase their automobile insurance and those who are self-insured
remained in effect.
V. Effects of the Repeal of Sections 1735 and 1737
With the repeal of sections 1735 and 1737 of the MVFRL, it is no
longer possible for an employee who is injured in a work-related
automobile accident to recover uninsured or underinsured benefits through
his employer's motor vehicle insurance policy.'57 Therefore, it seems
as though the distinction between self-insured employers and employers
who purchase motor vehicle insurance has been resolved. The repeal
took effect immediately upon enactment of the 1993 Amendments.5 "
With the reinstatement of the workers' compensation defense, it is
expected that employer's motor vehicle insurance policies will again be
written with provisions to offset uninsured/underinsured benefits by the
amount paid through workers' compensation benefits."' However, it
is unclear from the repeal whether the employee's automobile insurer can
also offset workers' compensation payments against
uninsured/underinsured coverage. 6° The decision in Selected Risks
held such set-off provisions to be contrary to public policy,' 6' but the
repeal of sections 1735 and 1737 effectively overrules Selected Risks.
Therefore, insurers will certainly interpret the repeal as validating such
set-off provisions. In all likelihood, insurers will attempt to insert these
set-off provisions in all motor vehicle insurance policies, not merely those
issued to employers. It seems as though the legislative intent is merely
to preclude employees from recovering uninsured/underinsured benefits
from' their employer's policy, but the intent is far from clear.
162
Therefore, the issue as to whether an employee can collect
155. Haggerty, supra note 128, at 5.
156. Jenkins v. City of Philadelphia, 621 A.2d 689 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993).
157. Act of July 2, 1993, Act No. 1993-44, 1993 Pa. Legis. Serv. 1, § 25(a) (Purdon).
158. Act of July 2, 1993, Act. No. 1993-44, 1993 Pa. Legis. Serv. 1, § 27 (Purdon).
159. Hait, supra note 94, at 1I.
160. Coffey & DiLoretto, supra note 77, at 5.
161. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
162. Phone interview with Phil DiMartile, Asst. to Senator Madigan, Senate Bill minority
chairman. (Oct. 26, 1993) (indicating that there was no debate or congressional hearings about the
repeal of sections 1735 and 1737 or 1720 and 1722).
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uninsured/underinsured benefits from his own motor vehicle policy will
inevitably be a source of future contention.'63
VI. The Fundamental Problems with the Repeals
The Pennsylvania Legislature's repeal of sections 1720, 1722, 1735
and 1737 of the MVFRL is unlikely to yield the intended results of
decreasing workers' compensation insurance premiums. Notwithstanding
this failure, the repeals will produce a windfall for the insurance
companies and will ultimately leave the injured employee less than fully
compensated for his injuries.
A. Anticipated Recoveries under Subrogation Rights and the Worker's
Compensation Defense will Produce a Windfall for the Insurer
The intended goal of the entire Workers' Compensation Reform was
to decrease the skyrocketing premiums 164 employers were paying for
workers' compensation insurance. 6' The amendments represent a
legislative compromise of approximately forty ways to achieve this
goal. 66 Presumably, allowing the insurer a right of subrogation is one
such means of decreasing workers' compensation premiums. 67  In
theory, it is a sound premise. Through subrogation, the insurer is able to
recoup some of the money it has paid out for claims, if and when the
injured employee recovers in a tort action from the liable third party.
68
Since the insurer is able to regain some of the money it pays to the
claimant, workers' compensation premiums should decrease.
In reality, this is not the case. The prospect of a successful
subrogation collection is not a factor in the insurer's rate
determination. 69  To accurately predict the amount that will eventually
163. Coffey & DiLoretto, supra note 77, at 5.
164. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
165. Interview with Ronald L. Calhoon, Workers' Compensation Attorney with Serratelli,
Schiffman & Brown, P.C., in Harrisburg, PA.(Oct. 27, 1993).
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. See KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 16, at § 3.10.
169. Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Chumbley, 394 S.W.2d 418, 425 (Mo. Ct. App.
1965)(recognizing that "automobile medical payments coverage is of comparatively recent origin.
It was conceived and reared without benefit of subrogation ... so 'conditioning' medical
payments coverage does not, in fact, work a perceptible reduction in the premium charged for
such coverage."). See also Allstate Ins. Co. v. Druke, 576 P.2d 489, 492 (Ariz. 1978). In
Druke, the court explained that:
[I]n terms of public policy, the only justification for allowing an insurance company
to recoup the benefits it contracted to pay out in exchange for the receipt for
premium payments which are presumably actuarially adequate would be the
lowering of premium rates as a result of such recoupment. This is generally not the
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be recovered through subrogated claims is next to impossible. 7 ' Any
attempt to do so would be mere conjecture on the part of the
insurers. 7 ' Therefore, in setting rate premiums, the insurer calculates
the anticipated losses for a pool of similarly situated insurers and then
charges each insured a pro-rata share of the total estimated losses for the
pool.'72  Subrogation does not enter into the calculation.173 Thus, in
effect, any amount collected through subrogation yields a windfall to the
insurer. 174
When applied to the present context, this concept becomes more
clear. The workers' compensation insurer collects premiums from
employers to cover an insured risk. Then, upon the occurrence of the risk,
the insurer reaps the proceeds of the injured party's tort recovery. The
insurer collects twice. One time from the employer for the premium, and
one time through subrogation of the employee's tort recovery. Therefore,
it is doubtful that permitting workers' compensation insurers a right of
subrogation will effectively serve to lower workers' compensation
premiums.
The repeal of sections 1735 and 1737 produces a similar windfall for
the insurer. In accordance with the repeals, an employee injured in the
scope of his employment may no longer maintain any claim for recovery
of uninsured/underinsured motorist benefits through his employer's motor
vehicle insurance policy.'75 But, the employer has still paid a separate
case ....
Id. See also Maxwell v. Allstate Ins. Cos., 728 P.2d 812, 815 (Nev. 1986)(finding that only
justification for permitting subrogation for medical payments would be the lowering of premium
rates as a result of the recoupment and indicating that such lowering did not generally follow
recoupment).
170. Baron, supra note 18, at 582.
171. Id.
172. Id. See also, KEETON & WIDISS, supra, note 16, at § 3.10 (b)(2).
The policyholder purchasing insurance for a venture pays an insurer a premium
which is calculated by estimating a number of factors, including (1) the
proportionate part of the total predicted cost of meeting specified types of losses in
the ventures that have been grouped by the insured into a 'pool of risks,' (2)
appropriate amounts for a reserve fund in the event the total risk was
underestimated, (3) the administrative costs of the insurer, (4) other expenses of
doing business (including fees for sales representatives such as agents and brokers),
and (5) profits for companies engaging in insurance as a business enterprise.
KEETON & WIDISS, supra, note 16, at § 3.13(b)(2).
173. Id.
174. EDWIN W. PATTERSON, ESSENTIALS OF INSURANCE LAW 51 (2d ed. 1957). See also
DeCespedes v. Prudence Mut. Casualty Co., 193 So.2d 224, 227-28 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1966)(recognizing that subrogation has been a double edged sword frequently resulting in a
source of windfall to insurers because anticipated recoveries under subrogation rights are
generally not reflected in computation of premium rates), aff'd, 202 So.2d 561 (Fla. 1967).
175. Haggerty, supra note 128, at 2.
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premium for the uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage. 76
Therefore, the employer is paying for protection that the employee will
never be able to utilize. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recognized
this fact in Selected Risks and stated that "to give the uninsured motorist
carrier a set-off based on the fortuitous existence of a collateral source
would result in a windfall to the carrier."' 77  (The collateral source in
this case being workers' compensation benefits.) Such a result is clearly
contrary to public policy. 78  The best way for employers to avoid
paying for this "illusory" coverage is to reject the optional
uninsured/underinsured motorist protection under section 1731 of the
MVFRL.
179
B. Subrogation Leads to Unjust Treatment of the Employee Injured in
a Work-Related Motor Vehicle Accident
Part of the underlying rationale for allowing an insurer a right of
subrogation is to prevent a "double recovery" on behalf of the
plaintiff.80  In fact, this viewpoint is held by a majority of
jurisdictions.' 8 ' However, in a more practical context, this notion of a
double recovery is a fallacy for numerous reasons.8 2 First, whenever
an individual suffers a personal injury, a precise calculation of loss is
difficult, if not impossible, to ascertain.' Non-economic losses such
as mental distress, pain and suffering are not entirely indemnifiable, nor
176. Selected Risks Ins. v. Thompson, 552 A.2d 1382 (Pa. 1989).
177. Id. at 1388.
178. Id. See also, Milbank Ins. Co. v. Henry, 441 N.W.2d 143, 149 (Neb. 1989)
(Fahmbruch, J., dissenting). Justice Fahmbruch stated in dissent that "[plublic policy requires
that insurance companies deliver what has been paid for by the insured and that the insured
receives more than illusory coverage."
179. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1731(a)(Supp. 1993). The statute expressly provides in
pertinent part:
(a) Mandatory offering.-No motor vehicle liability insurance policy shall be
delivered or issued for delivery in this commonwealth, with respect to any motor
vehicle registered or principally garaged in this Commonwealth, unless uninsured
motorist and underinsured motorist coverages are offered therein or supplemental
thereto in amounts as provided in section 1734 (relating to request for lower limits
of coverage). Purchase of uninsured motorist and underinsured motorist coverages
is optional.
Id. (emphasis added).
180. See, e.g., Lattimer v. Boucher, 458 A.2d 528, 530 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1983);
see also Smith v. Travelers Ins. Co., 362 N.E.2d 264 (Ohio 1977).
181. Baron, supra note 18, at 584.
182. Id. at 585.
183. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co. v. State Bd., 637 P.2d 1251, 1255 (Okla. 1981)(recognizing




are they insurable.'84 These intangibles make a "full" recovery from
a third-party tortfeasor rare, not to mention a "double recovery." Second,
settlements are negotiated with third-party tortfeasors (or their insurers)
with the knowledge that the injured parties' medical expenses have or
will be paid by other sources.8 5 This factor often leads to lower
settlement offers and consequently smaller recoveries.8 6
Likewise, the injured party may be forced to compromise his claim
against the third-party because of other complicating factors. The injured
party may have a pre-existing condition that makes it difficult to establish
which injuries are the result of the accident and which conditions are past
injuries.87
Additionally, the injured party frequently must compromise a claim
against a third party because ... (1) imposition of liability upon the
third party may be subject to dispute; (2) the third-party tortfeasor
may have limited assets or limited liability insurance coverage; (3) the
applicable law may not provide for the recovery to the injured party
from the tortfeasor for certain losses; and (4) future losses of income
and other future damages may be omitted from the recovery."'
According to this rationale, if subrogation is denied to workers'
compensation insurers, a double recovery is unlikely to occur for the
injured employee.
However, under the same rationale, permitting subrogation within the
context of workers' compensation is actually likely to prevent the injured
employee from being fully compensated. The insurer's subrogation right
is to the total amount of the plaintiff-employee's recovery less a pro-rata
share of attorney fees and costs. 9 There is no consideration made for
the fact that the plaintiff-employee's recovery may have been
compromised by any of the, previously mentioned factors.. When the
insurer takes out of the tort recovery all the expenses paid under workers'
compensation, it leaves little for the employee for non-economic
losses. 9 In this way, subrogation prevents the employee from being
fully compensated.
184. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Druke, 576 P.2d 489, 492 (Ariz. 1978).
185. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Reitler, 628 P.2d 667, 670 (Mont. 1981).
186. Id.
187. Hait, supra note 94, at 4.
188. Baron, supra note 18, at 598 (citations omitted).
189. Rollins Outdoor Advertising et al. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Board, 487
A.2d 794 (Pa. 1985).
190. Non-economic losses are defined as "pain and suffering and other nonmonetary
detriment." 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1702 (Supp. 1993).
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Indeed, the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court recognized this
assertion as true. 19' The court concluded that:
It becomes apparent, then that the victim described herein may not
only fail to receive a windfall but just as likely, may receive less than
full compensation for his losses. The injured victim who is forced,
through subrogation, to turn over to his workmen's compensation
source funds he has recovered from a tortfeasor may end up realizing
nothing for his non-economic losses. The elimination of subrogation,
thus furthers the goal of providing complete compensation to the
innocent victim of a motor vehicle accident. 92
An employee injured in a job-related motor vehicle accident may be
more in need of workmen's compensation benefits than an employee
injured in any other work-related accident. If the injured employee sues
the negligent driver in tort, under the MVFRL that driver is only required
to respond in damages for liability in the amount of $15,000 for injury
to one person in one accident and $30,000 for two or more persons
injured in one accident. 93 It is conceivable that the injured employee
will have economic losses alone equivalent to $15,000, not to mention
medical expenses. The tortfeasor, therefore, may not be able to
adequately compensate an accident victim. By allowing subrogation by
the workers' compensation insurer, there is virtually nothing left for non-
economic losses. This certainly cannot be considered a complete
recovery.
In fact, by permitting the workers' compensation insurer to
subrogate, the legislature has undermined the purpose of the MVFRL--"to
provide prompt and complete relief for motor vehicle accident
victims."' 94 Due to the potential injustice that will befall the employee,
the repeal of sections 1720 and 1722 is improper.
C. The Injured Employee Should Still Be Able to Collect
Uninsured/Underinsured Benefits from his Own Motor Vehicle
Insurance Policy
Notwithstanding the repeal of sections 1735 and 1737 of the
MVFRL, the employee injured by an uninsured motorist should still be
able to collect uninsured/underinsured benefits. Nothing in the MVFRL
prevents an employee who is injured within the course of his employment
1122
191. Waiters v. Kamppi, 545 A.2d 975, 978 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1988).
192. Id. (emphasis in original).
193. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1702 (Supp. 1993).
194. Walters, 545 A.2d at 978.
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from making a claim against his own insurance company for uninsured
or underinsured motorists benefits.195  The ability to collect
uninsured/underinsured benefits from one's own automobile insurance
policy is predicated on the theory that uninsured motorist coverage is
personal and not restricted to a certain vehicle. 96
Likewise, courts have consistently upheld the fundamental principle
that an insured is entitled to receive the insurance benefits for which he
has paid a premium.197 In the case of uninsured/underinsured benefits,
the employee has paid a separate premium for this coverage. To deny
him those benefits simply because he received workers' compensation
benefits is to deny him the protection for which he has paid. There is no
public policy against an individual purchasing additional
uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage to protect himself and his
family against the shortfalls which could result from a dependency on
workers' compensation benefits. 98 Therefore, even if the employee
cannot recover uninsured/underinsured benefits through his employer's
automobile liability policy, he should be entitled to those benefits under
his own automobile insurance policy.
195. See Hackenburg, 586 A.2d at 883 n.10; see also, Carey v. Electric Mut. Liab. Ins. Co.,
500 F. Supp. 1227 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
196. In Harvey v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 449 A.2d 157 (Conn. 1982), the court held:
Our uninsured motorist insurance statute ... provides coverage for persons insured
thereunder who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of
uninsured motor vehicles .... The coverage is portable: The insured and family
members ... are insured no matter where they are injured. They are insured when
injured in an owned vehicle named in the policy, in an owned vehicle not named in
the policy, on a motorcycle, on a bicycle, whether afoot or on horseback or even on
a pogo stick.
Id. at 160 (citations omitted). See also, Bradley v. Mid-Century Ins. Co., 294 N.W.2d 141 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1980); National Service Fire Ins. Co. v. Mikell, 204 So.2d 343 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1967).
197. See Mid-Century Ins. Co. v. Daniel, 705 P.2d 156 (Nev. 1985); Sullivan v. Dairyland
Insurance Co., 649 P.2d 1357 (Nev. 1982).
198. See Selected Risks Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 552 A.2d 1382 (Pa. 1989); see also
Southeast Furniture Co. v. Barrett, 465 P.2d 346 (Utah 1970). The court stated that:
[w]e think that.., a breadwinner has the right to supplement any benefits to which
he may be entitled under the workmen's compensation act, by procuring and paying
whatever premium he can squeeze out of his budget for an independent policy with
an independent carrier in as large an amount as he can afford, without giving up any
workmen's compensation benefits.
Id. at 348.
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VII. Conclusion
The 1993 reform of the Pennsylvania Workers' Compensation Act
is intended to decrease the cost of workers' compensation premiums. As
part of the effort to reduce costs, the Pennsylvania Legislature repealed
four provisions of the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law--
sections 1720, 1722, 1735 and 1737. The repeals allow the insurer a
right of subrogation for the amount of workers' compensation benefits
paid and eliminate the employee's ability to collect
uninsured/underinsured benefits through their employer's automobile
insurance policy.
In actuality, the repeal will fail to meet the objection of decreasing
workers' compensation insurance premiums. The money that is recouped
by the insurers will not be calculated into the premium rates. As a result,
any amount that the insurer receives through subrogation is a windfall to
the insurer. Denying the employee the right to collect
uninsured/underinsured motorist benefits through their employer's
automobile insurance policy also acts as a windfall to the insurer because
the employer is paying for uncollectible benefits. The reinstitution of
subrogation also leaves the employee less than fully compensated for his
injuries. However, in the event an employee is injured by an uninsured
or underinsured motorist, the employee should still be entitled to recover
uninsured or underinsured motorist benefits from his own automobile
insurance policy.
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